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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060509-CA

v.
JIMMIE & ANITA MAE BUTLER,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
theft, a second degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony
(R. 388-91) .

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Have defendants carried their substantial burden of

showing their counsel was ineffective where their claims of
prejudice are speculative, their briefing is inadequate, and they
have not shown that counsel's trial strategies were anything but
legitimate?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendants' motion to arrest judgment where the evidence and its

1

fair inferences sufficed to prove that defendants committed
forgery and theft?
Before a trial court may substitute its judgment for that of
the jury by arresting judgment, the court must determine that the
"the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element
of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to that element."

State v. Workman, 852 P.2d

981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) .
"The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a
clear abuse of that discretion."

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d

220, 222 (Utah 1985); accord State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, I 5,
984 P.2d 975 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937,
940 (Utah 1993)).

In general, an appellate court "will presume

that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised
unless the record clearly shows the contrary."

Goddard v.

Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)(citation omitted).

To

constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court's
determination must be "beyond the limits of reasonability."
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

2

687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of
the underlying trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11

16-17, 12 P.3d 92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are
dispositive in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged with one count each of theft, a
second degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony (R. 13).

A jury convicted them as charged (R. 203-04, 211-12).

Prior

to sentencing, new defense counsel filed a motion to arrest
judgment (R. 214-15, 270-72, 286-317).

After a hearing, the

trial court denied the motion (R. 465; R. 347-54 at addendum A ) .
Based on the same grounds, defendants then filed a motion for new
trial (R. 362-64, 365-84).

The trial court entered judgement,

imposed and stayed the sentence, and issued a commitment order
(R.

388-91).

After another hearing, the trial court denied the

motion for new trial (R. 443-47 at addendum B ) .

Defendants

timely filed a notice of appeal from the denial of the new trial
motion (R. 456-57).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Elmer Butler, the 83-year-old victim, spent his working life
as a real estate developer, subdividing large parcels of land
into hundreds of house lots and then selling them (R. 463: 46,

3

60-61).
61).

He understood well the process of conveyancing (Id. at

In 1999, after losing his wealth in a lawsuit arising from

a fatal pedestrian-truck collision for which he was uninsured, he
purchased a home in Cedar City with his remaining funds.

He

intended to live there with his wife until they both died (Id. at
61, 74-75).

The warranty deed listed Elmer and his wife of more

than fifty years, Edna Mae, as joint tenants of the property (Id.
at 48-49, 53, 96) .
In March, 2001, Edna Mae died (Id. at 50, 67). About a
month later, Elmer asked his daughter, Marilyn, to accompany him
to the title company office to remove his deceased wife's name
from the title and add Marilyn's name, thus avoiding probate in
the future (Id. at 67; R. 464: 199). An escrow officer for the
title company, who had previously worked with Elmer on other
deeds, testified that she executed both an affidavit severing the
joint tenancy between Elmer and Edna Mae and a warranty deed
conveying the property from Elmer to Elmer and Marilyn (R. 463 at
96-97).

She stated at trial, M I think he's the only person in 20

years that's ever walked through the door with a death
certificate.
do.

Most people come in and ask me what they need to

He actually came in and was specific about the documents

that he wanted" (Id. at 95).
That fall, Marilyn was helping her father with his bills.
Elmer showed Marilyn a tax notice for the property, with the name
and address whited out, and Elmer's name handwritten in next to

4

it (Id. at 68). Marilyn testified: "We held it up to the light
and it said Anita Butler and Anita's address" (Id.).

Anita,

Elmer's daughter-in-law, was married to Elmer's son, Jimmie.
Elmer immediately summoned Jimmie to the house (Id.).
When confronted with the tax notice, Jimmie told his father
that the house belonged to Anita, that Edna Mae had given it to
her, and that Elmer had signed the warranty deed while
intoxicated (Id. at 69). At trial, Elmer vehemently denied ever
signing the deed or intending to transfer ownership of his home
(Id. at 47, 48, 61, 63, 69; R. 464: 195). He and Marilyn both
maintained that Edna Mae would never have given the home away (R.
463: 53, 69, 72, 74). The warranty deed conveying the property
from Elmer and Edna to Anita was notarized on April 23, 1999,
shortly after Elmer and Edna Mae moved into the home.

It was

recorded on April 3, 2001, two weeks after Edna Mae died (R.
325) .
The warranty deed was the subject of much trial testimony.
A school administrator testified that he had notarized around
fifty documents, mostly wage garnishments, during the five years
he was a notary.

The remaining documents, no more than five to

ten, were brought to him by school employees or by other persons
he knew (R. 463: 79-80).

He testified that he had no

recollection of the warranty deed at issue, although it did
appear to bear both his signature and notary stamp (Id. at 81,
87).

Noting that the deed required the signatures of Edna,

5

Elmer, Anita, and a witness, and that he always did notaries in
his office, he stated, "I'm basically certain I never did a
notary with four people" (Id. at 83, 84, 87). He also stated
that he had never seen Elmer prior to the preliminary hearing;
that contrary to what appeared on the warranty deed, he did not
use a typewriter to complete documents he notarized; and that his
log book did not attest to this notary event (Id, at 85, 90, 91) .
A questioned document examiner opined with "high
probability" that the warranty deed conveying the Cedar City
property from Elmer and Edna to Anita was a "simulated forgery,"
with Elmer's name forged by someone familiar with his handwriting
(R. 463: 115, 126, 139). x

The examiner also opined with "strong

probability" that Edna Mae had signed the document (Id. at 120).
The owner of a Cedar City title company also testified,
stating that he had notarized a trust deed in Anita Butler's name
that secured a loan of $75,000 to her against the Cedar City
property (Id. at 101-02).

Further, a real estate broker

testified that defendants had tried to sell the Cedar City
property during the summer of 2002, but that the sale fell
through because the title was not clear (R. 464: 201-02).

1

This witness also testified that another warranty deed,
not at issue in this case, was similarly forged (R. 463: 115,
118, 120, 139). This testimony was corroborated by a notary, who
testified that she had notarized only Anita Butler on the
document. She was confident the document had been altered
because the names of Elmer and Edna were added after she
completed her notarization (Id. at 166-67).
6

Jimmie and Anita's daughter, Hollie, testified on her
parents' behalf.

Twenty years old at the time of trial, she

stated that "a long time before" her grandmother became ill, both
her grandparents decided to deed the house to her (R. 463: 186).
She testified, "They were leaving it to me, and I was a minor at
the time, so they deeded it to my mom to deed to me after they
weren't there anymore" (Id. at 181). Hollie maintained that her
grandparents, Elmer and Edna Mae, as well as her parents, Jimmie
and Anita, all signed the deed conveying the property "right
there in front of me" at the Cedar City home (Id. at 185).
Hollie opined that because Elmer drank "all the time, . . .

he

was probably drunk" when he signed the deed (Id.).
Based on this evidence, a jury convicted defendants as
charged (R. at 211-12) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants contest the trial court's denial of their motions
to arrest judgment and for a new trial.

However, the crux of

their complaint is that they received ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Their multiple claims of ineffectiveness all fail

either because their counsel was exercising a legitimate trial
strategy, because their claim of prejudice was entirely
speculative, or because their briefing is inadequate.
Their remaining claim is that the motion to arrest judgment
was improperly denied because the state failed to prove "a public
offense" as that phrase is used in rule 23, Utah Rules of

7

Criminal Procedure.

This argument fails because defendants have

not complied with the marshaling requirement.

It also fails on

the merits because the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to prove defendants
committed forgery and theft.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT CARRIED THEIR
SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN OF SHOWING
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHERE THEIR
CLAIMS OF PREJUDICE ARE
SPECULATIVE, THEIR BRIEFING IS
INADEQUATE, AND THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN
THAT COUNSEL'S TRIAL STRATEGIES
WERE ANYTHING BUT LEGITIMATE
The crux of defendants' claim is that they received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.2
20-29.

See Br. of Aplt. at

They urge multiple instances of ineffectiveness, all of

which fail either because their counsel was exercising a
legitimate trial strategy, or because their claim of prejudice
was speculative, or because their briefing is inadequate.

Where

defendants have failed to demonstrate either deficient
performance or prejudice, the trial court properly determined
2

The claim arose after defendants procured new counsel,
following trial but before sentencing. At that juncture, counsel
filed a motion to arrest judgment premised on ineffective
assistance. When the trial court denied the motion, counsel
filed a motion for new trial, also based on ineffective
assistance. Again, the trial court denied the motion.
Defendants now argue that the trial court erred in denying both
motions. The dispositive issue, however, is not the propriety of
the court's denial of the motions, but rather whether defense
counsel performed ineffectively at trial.
8

their counsel was not ineffective and, accordingly, denied
defendants' motions to arrest judgment and for a new trial.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
defendants must demonstrate both that their counsel's performance
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at

687; State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990).
When reviewing trial counsel's work to assess deficient
performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance."

State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d

681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)).

"If a rational basis for

counsel's performance can be articulated, [this Court] will
assume counsel acted competently."
461, 468 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d

Thus, "an ineffective assistance

claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions."

Id.

When reviewing trial counsel's work for prejudice,
defendants must show that "counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable."
at 687).

Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
Defendants must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice by

9

showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, "the result of the proceeding would have
been different."

Id. at 187.

A. Failure to introduce evidence of power of attorney or
investigate claims of Elmer's drinking
Defendants first argue that their counsel performed
ineffectively by failing to introduce into evidence a power of
attorney, pursuant to which Elmer allegedly gave Edna Mae the
authority to sign documents for him.

See Br. of Aplt. at 20-21.

Counsel asserts that if the jury had known that Edna Mae could
have signed the warranty deed for Elmer, the jury would have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the document was forged.
at 20.

Id.

This argument fails on the deficient performance prong of

ineffective assistance because it directly conflicts with
defendants' theory of the case, which was not that Edna Mae
signed the document, but that Elmer himself signed it and later
forgot that he had done so (R.464: 223-24).

Indeed, the sole

witness for the defense was Elmer's granddaughter, Hollie Butler,
who testified unequivocally that she saw Elmer sign the warranty
deed in the presence of his wife, son, and daughter-in-law (R.
463: 184-85).

Plainly, then, defense counsel had a "rational

basis'' for choosing not to introduce the power of attorney.
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468.

Had he done so, he would have

effectively undermined his own theory of defense.
Defendants next claim that their counsel performed
ineffectively by not investigating whether Elmer signed the deed
10

while intoxicated.

See Br. of Aplt. at 26-27.

The defense

theorized that Elmer intentionally signed the warranty deed over
to Hollie's mother, Anita Butler, in order to give the house to
his granddaughter when she reached her majority.

For the defense

to prevail, the jury had to believe Hollie's testimony that her
grandfather knowingly signed the deed in the presence of his
family.

Had counsel pursued a line of questioning about Elmer's

drinking, however, counsel would have emphasized precisely the
part of Hollie's testimony that it wished to underplay.

That is,

while emphasizing Elmer's drinking bolstered the theory that he
simply did not remember signing the document, it could also
directly erode the defense theory that he knowingly signed the
deed.

Because counsel had reason to believe that pursuing

further evidence of Elmer's drinking was a double-edged sword
that could be harmful to the defense, counsel could reasonably
decide not to further press the matter.

See State v. Montova,

2004 UT 5, 1 24, 84 P.3d 1183 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
691); see. also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App.
1992)(to establish deficient performance, defendant must show
counsel's actions "were not conscious trial strategy").
The crux of the matter is that defendants' deficient
performance arguments are premised on a new theory of the case,
developed only after the jury rendered its verdict and trial
counsel had been replaced.

See R. 211-12; 214-15.

Defendants'

new counsel, aided by hindsight, entertained an alternative

11

theory of the case — that Edna Mae signed the document for Elmer.
However appealing such a theory may now be, it cannot serve to
establish deficient performance by previous counsel, who acted on
a legitimate, though different, trial strategy.

See, e.g.. State

v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) ("An
ineffectiveness claim succeeds only when no conceivable
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's
actions.

Moreover, this court will not second-guess trial

counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those
choices might appear in retrospect" (quotations and citations
omitted)).

The law is well-settled that "[a] lawyer's legitimate

exercise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy that does
not produce the anticipated result does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel."

State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d

667, 672 (Utah App. 1988)(citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d
1101, 1109 (Utah 1983); State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah
1976)).
B.

For this reason, defendants' claims fail.
Failure to impeach Elmer

Defendants also fault their attorney for failing to impeach
Elmer's testimony.

See Br. of Aplt. at 21-23.

Counsel contends

that Elmer's failing memory should have been highlighted to the
jury, and also that trial counsel should have objected to
"statements that contained strong inferences of guilt . . . [and]
narratives" (Br. of Aplt. at 22). These unadorned assertions
fail to establish either deficient performance or prejudice.

12

First, on its face, Elmer's testimony made quite clear that
his memory was less than perfect.

He could not accurately

remember his address, when he moved into his Cedar City home, or
his age (R. 463: 44-46).

Had trial counsel frontally attacked

Elmer's memory, however, he would have run the risk of being
perceived by the jury as badgering the 83-year-old victim and
thus enhancing the jury's sympathy for this elderly man who
claimed defendants had stolen his home.

Tactically, then, where

the testimony spoke for itself, counsel had good reason to
refrain from aggressively attacking Elmer.

Instead, defense

counsel wisely let Elmer's failing memory speak for itself.

As

was proper, counsel let the jury assess Elmer's credibility and
the extent to which his inability to remember basic personal
information might also indicate faulty memory in other areas.
See, e.g., Workman, 852 P.2d st 984 (holding that jury serves as
exclusive judge of witness credibility).
Second, defendants have not specified which statements
"contained strong inferences of guilt" or what "narratives" were
detrimental to the defense.

They have thus failed to "identify

specific acts" falling "outside the wide range of professional
assistance" that constitute deficient performance.

State v.

Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998)(quotations and citations
omitted).

Moreover, they have not established demonstrable

prejudice, asserting only that counsel's perceived deficient
performance "may have prejudiced the jury" or that "the outcome

13

of the trial may have been different" (Br. of Aplt. at 22, 23).
"On many occasions, this court has reiterated that proof of
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter
but must be a demonstrable reality."

Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d

870, 877 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted).

Having failed to

specifically articulate deficient performance or demonstrably
establish prejudice, defendants' allegation of ineffective
assistance stands as an unadorned and speculative claim.
v. Arauelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996).

State

Consequently, it

fails.3
C.

Stipulating to recording of warranty deed

Defendants argue that trial counsel performed deficiently by
stipulating to the admittance of the warranty deed without first
calling as a witness the recorder of the deed, whom the parties
had stipulated would confirm that Anita Butler requested the
recording.

See Br. of Aplt. at 25; accord R. 263: 174.

As a

matter of course, parties often stipulate to facts that are so
3

Defendants' argument that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to Marilyn's testimony also fails for lack
of demonstrable prejudice. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,
523 (Utah 1994)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)(approving
analysis of prejudice prong only to dispose of ineffective
assistance claim). Merely alleging that testimony is "highly
prejudicial" does not make it so. See, e.g., Br. of Aplt. at 24
("Because [Marilyn] Goldberg's highly prejudicial responses were
heard by the jury, it severely prejudiced the case"). Moreover,
lacking any record citations, the issue is inadequately briefed.
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9). Where an appellant fails to
adequately brief an issue, a reviewing court may decline to
consider the argument. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1
11, 974 P.2d 269 (citations omitted); Mackav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d
941, 947-48 (Utah 1998) .
14

uncontroverted, so clear on their face, that they do not warrant
the expenditure of further adjudicative resources.

Thus, parties

will often stipulate to facts that one party would otherwise have
to prove.

To establish deficient performance here, defendants

would have to show that there is evidence contesting the agreedupon facts.

Defendants have not done so.

Absent such proof,

adduced pursuant to a rule 23B remand hearing, defendants'
ineffective assistance claim is purely speculative and,
consequently, fails.
D.

Arquelles, 921 P.2d at 441.

Failure to properly analyze evidence

Finally, defendants claim that trial counsel performed
ineffectively by failing "to analyze any of the documents
presented at trial and . . .

to undermine any inferences made by

the notaries as to the alleged alterations of the documents" (Br.
of Aplt. at 25-26).
This claim fails because it is inadequately briefed.
Defendants do not articulate which specific documents they are
referencing, how those documents should have been analyzed, what
such an analysis would have produced, and how the results of the
analysis would have changed the outcome of the trial.4
4

They have

Defendants also claim that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to the use of certified copies of certain
unspecified documents. See Br. of Aplt. at 28-29. This claim
fails because they have not specified which documents they are
referencing or what the originals would have shown that the
certified copies lacked. Indeed, they virtually concede that
their claim is entirely speculative when they surmise that "it is
possible that documentation was used and relied upon that was
incomplete" and, further, that if the documentation was
15

also not specified what "inferences" either of the notaries made
that were suspect or what further investigation would have
revealed.

And they have cited no legal authority to support

their unadorned allegations.
"A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research."

State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 120, 63

P. 3d 72 (quotations and citations omitted).

NX

An issue is

inadequately briefed ^when the overall analysis of the issue is
so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the
reviewing court.'"

Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 1 8, 995

P.2d 14 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)).
Where defendants have offered briefing that is wholly inadequate,
neither specifying their claims nor the rationale for the results
they seek, this Court should decline to consider them.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S
VERDICT, SUFFICED TO ESTABLISH THAT
DEFENDANTS COMMITTED BURGLARY AND
THEFT
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying

incomplete, that "may have led to crucial evidence being omitted
. . . ." (Id. at 28). Such bald speculation has never been
sufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
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their motion to arrest judgment because no direct evidence proved
that they forged the warranty deed.

See Br. of Aplt. at 29-30.

They phrase their argument in terms of rule 23, asserting that
"the facts proved . . .
Utah R. Crim. P. 23.

do not constitute a public offense."

In essence, however, they argue that the

evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.

See

Workman, 852 P.2d at 984 ("The standard for determining whether
an order arresting judgment is erroneous is the same as that
applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury
verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence").
This Court should decline to address this claim because
defendants have not marshaled the evidence in support of the
verdict and then shown why it is "so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to
that element."
(Utah 1983)) .

Id., (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445
Marshaling requires defendants to gather and

present, in a light most favorable to the verdict, "every scrap
of competent evidence . . . which supports the very findings
[they] resist."

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d

1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).

They must "fully embrac[e] the

[State's] position" without "simply rearguing and
recharacterizing" the evidence.

State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, i

17, 124 P.3d 235 (citations and quotations omitted); see also
Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App.
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1991)(rejecting appellant's claim where he persistently argued
his own position while marshaling).

Failure to properly marshal

the evidence suffices to reject a sufficiency claim.

See, e.g.,

Clark, 2005 UT 75 at 1 17; State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16,
989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800
(Utah 1991).

Where, as here, defendants have failed to comply

with the marshaling requirement, they cannot prevail on their
argument that the trial court should have granted their motion to
arrest judgment.
In any event, defendants' claim fails on the merits.

While

they assert that no evidence directly proved that either of them
forged the warranty deed, they wholly ignore the circumstantial
evidence and the fair inferences based on the evidence before the
jury.

The victim, Elmer Butler, was an experienced real estate

professional, familiar with the nuances of conveying property (R.
468: 57, 60-61, 71). He testified unequivocally that he did not
sign the home over to Anita and Jimmie and did not authorize
anyone else to convey the property for him (Id. at 47-48, 61). A
questioned document examiner testified that Elmer's signature was
a forgery, written by someone familiar with Elmer's handwriting
who tried to copy it (Id. at 115).
Anita Butler recorded the forged deed (Id. at 174).

She

later secured a loan for $75,000, using the deed as security for
the loan (Id. at 101). Moreover, Anita and Jimmie together put
the home on the market and tried to sell it during the summer of
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2002, while the title to the house was still in dispute (R. 464:
201-02) .

Their actions impliedly contradicted the testimony of

their daughter, Hollie, who was the only defense witness.

She

maintained that Elmer and his wife intended to give the house to
her and that Elmer signed it over to Anita to hold for her until
her grandparents died (R. 463: 181). Hollie's testimony directly
conflicted with the testimony of her grandfather, who stated he
never intended or discussed giving the home to her (R. 464: 195).
Evaluating this evidence and its fair inferences, the trial
court opined:
The jury had a clear choice. Did they
believe that the victim signed the deed, that
he had now forgotten the signing, and that
the expert witness was mistaken, or did they
believe that the defendants had prepared and
uttered the deed for their own gain. They
obviously chose to believe the latter. It is
certainly reasonable for the jury to infer
that the purported grantee and her husband,
the ones who stood to gain from the forgery,
and the ones who did gain from the forgery,
and the ones who would be in a position to
simulate the signature of the victim, were
guilty of forging the document, or at least
uttering the document that they knew to be
forged.
R. 353 at addendum A.

In denying defendants' motion to arrest

judgment, the trial court properly deferred to the jury's role as
"exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given particular evidence."
984 (and cases cited therein).

Workman,, 852 P. 2d at

Accordingly, where the evidence

sufficed to support the jury's verdict, the trial court did not
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abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion to arrest
judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendants'
conviction on one count each of forgery, a second degree felony,
and theft, a third degree felony.
T^—

RESPECTFULLY submitted this lj)_ day of June, 2007.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FII

Plaintiff,
CASENOS.

vs.

OCT - 3 2005
FIFTH D.'STR'CT COURT

JIMMIE BUTLER and
ANITA MAE BUTLER,

021501176 FS
IRCN CCJNTV
021501175 #<fUTYCLERfc

Defendants.

The two defendants Jimmie and Anita Mae Butler, who are husband and wife, were tried
by a jury on February 17, 2005. They were represented at trial by Keith Barnes, their attorney.
The State was represented by Troy Little, Chief Deputy County Attorney for Iron County. At the
conclusion of the trial, the defendants were both found guilty of Theft, a 2nd Degree Felony and
Forgery, a 3rd Degree Felony. A Presentence Investigation was ordered prior to sentencing.
Thereafter, the defendants retained the services of another attorney, Michael W. Isbell,
who, on May 9, 2005, filed on behalf of both defendants a Motion to Arrest Judgment prior to
the sentencing hearing. The State has now filed a written response to that Motion and oral
argument was held on August 29, 2005. The court took the matter under submission, and having
now reviewed the file, the Memoranda of the attorneys, and the record of the trial, the court
enters the following ruling on the pending Motion.
FACTS
Although the complete record of the trial has not been transcribed, but is available for
transcription, a brief recitation of the facts will be helpful to an understanding of the court's
ruling.

#n

The victim in this case is an elderly man, Elmer Butler. The defendants are his son and
daughter in law. At trial Elmer testified that when his wife, Edna Mae, died in March 2001, he
went to the County Recorder to take the necessary steps to remove Edna Mae's name from the
deed to their marital home. When he tried to file the required proof of her death, he discovered
that the home was no longer in his and his wife's name, but had been deeded to his daughter in
law, Anita Butler, one of the defendants. The deed which made the transfer of title purported to
have been signed by Elmer, his wife Edna Mae, and Anita Butler. Jimmie Butler's signature
appeared on the deed as a witness.
Elmer testified that he never signed the Warranty Deed which conveyed the property to
Anita Butler, nor did he authorized anyone else to do so. He claimed that the house had been
taken from him without his consent.
The State next called Marilyn Goldberg, a daughter of Elmer and Edna Mae, who testified
that she had accompanied her father when he went to take Edna Mae's name off the deed.
The State next called Kent Ferrill Peterson, the notary public whose signature appears on
the disputed deed. Mr. Peterson testified that he did not remember notarizing that deed, which
was dated April 23rd, 1999.
The State next called Jill Orton, an escrow officer with First American Title, who
testified that she prepared the Affidavit necessary to take Edna's name off the deed and gave it to
Elmer and Marilyn Goldberg.
The State next called Mitchell Schoppmann, owner of Cedar Land and Title, who
testified that he prepared deeds on the property in question, including a trust deed to allow Anita
Butler to secure a $75,000 loan on the property after the disputed deed made her the record
owner of the property.
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The State also called as a witness George Matthew Throckmorton, an employee of the
Salt Lake City Crime Lab, a crime scene investigator, and a questioned documents examiner.
Mr. Throckmorton opined that the deed in question had not been signed by Elmer, but that his
apparent signature was in fact a "simulated forgery", meaning that whoever signed the deed
would have been familiar with the signature of Elmer and tried to make the signature on the deed
look like Elmer's writing. In making this examination, Mr. Throckmorton compared the
signatures on the deed in question, and another deed purportedly signed by Elmer, to known
samples of Elmer's writing. Mr. Throckmorton concluded that both of the deeds he looked at
were simulated forgeries, and both were likely signed by the same person. Both deeds purported
to convey property to Anita Butler from Elmer and Edna Mae Butler.
Mr. Throckmorton did opine that there was a "strong possibility" that the purported
signature by Edna Mae Butler on the deed in question was in fact her signature although he could
not so state conclusively.
The State's final witness was Mitzi McLeroy, a retired employee of Zion's Bank who
testified that she notarized the second deed looked at by Mr. Throckmorton.
After the State rested, the defense called its principle witness, Hollie Mae Butler, who is
the daughter of the defendants and the grand daughter of the victim Elmer Butler. Hollie testified
that Elmer was a heavy drinker of alcohol, that Elmer wanted to deed the house to her but she
was a minor, and so he deeded the house to Anita to be deeded to her went she was an adult. She
testified that she was present when the deed was signed and she saw it signed by Elmer, Edna
Mae, and both defendants. She testified that this signing happened before Edna Mae's final
illness, although she could not give an exact date.
Neither of the defendants chose to testify.

3

In rebuttal, the State recalled Elmer and Marilyn Goldberg, and then called Rhett
Shakespeare, a local real estate broker, who testified that in June, 2002, the Butlers, Jimmie and
Anita, tried to sell the house, which was in direct contravention of the testimony of Hollie that
Anita was holding the house in trust for her.
At no time during the trial did either side mention the existence of a Power of Attorney
which purported to give Edna Mae Butler power to sign a deed for Elmer Butler. The court was
never made aware of the existence of such a document. Certainly, the defendants, if they knew
of that document, could have raised its existence during the trial. However, if they had done so,
and then had claimed that the victim's signature on the deed was actually signed by his wife,
Edna Mae Butler, they would have thoroughly impeached the testimony of Hollie Butler, who
testified that she saw her grandfather, the victim, sign the deed himself. No one presented any
evidence to indicate that it was Edna Mae Butler who signed the deed in question for Elmer.
That argument was never raised until after the jury had rendered its verdict in the case. There has
never been any evidence presented to indicate that Edna Mae placed her husband's signature on
the questioned deed.
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of the defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally
ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. ..."

ARGUMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS
In their Motion, the defendants raise the following arguments:
1. The defense presented by defendants' attorney did not rise to the level required of
competent counsel and was therefore ineffective assistance of counsel.
4

2. The facts proved against the defendants do not constitute a public offense.
3. The jury's verdict was based upon prejudice and psychological pressures.
4. The theft conviction hinges upon a forgery conviction.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In its response to the Motion, the State of Utah raises first an issue as to whether a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel can properly be raised by way of a Motion To Arrest
Judgment. The parties agree that the rule itself does not specifically list as one of the permissible
grounds for such a Motion a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, if the claim is
cognizable under Rule 23, it would have to be under the "other good cause" catchall phrase.
Neither party was able to find any conclusive law on this question, nor has the court
located any applicable law which addresses the question directly. The State points out that in
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court has said that
"...ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claims] should be raised on appeal if the trial record is
adequate to permit decision of the issue and defendant is represented by counsel other than trial
counsel" citing State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) and Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 619
(Utah 1989). However, the defendants argue that because of the procedural posture of that case,
the decision in Humphries does not resolve the question presented in this case.
The State also points out that the Rules of Appellate Procedure now provide a way for an
appellant to supplement the trial record, if necessary, so that a complete record can be provided
to the appellate court. [See Rule 23B(a) UR.App.P.]
In this case, the principle argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel which
defendants now advance is that their trial attorney did not present evidence to the jury of a Power
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of Attorney which the victim had given to his now deceased wife prior to the signing of the deed
in question in this case. Although it is true that the existence of that document was not presented
to the jury, the reasons therefore are not now part of the trial record. Those reasons could be
explored and developed as part of an appeal, pursuant to the above cited Rule of Procedure. If
the defendants and their trial attorney knew of the existence of the Power of Attorney and chose
not to use it during the trial because it would weaken the testimony of the principle defense
witness who testified that she saw the victim sign the deed in question himself, there could be no
ineffective assistance claim. Rather it would appear that the failure to alert the jury to the
existence of that document would have been a reasonable and deliberate trial tactic.
Therefore, under the pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court, the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and in view of the particular facts of this case, the court now finds that the
defendants' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised by them on direct appeal
rather than by way of the Motion To Arrest Judgment. The Motion To Arrest Judgment is hereby
denied as it relies on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised by the defendants.
DID STATE PROVE A PUBLIC OFFENSE AGAINST DEFENDANTS?
Clearly the State presented evidence sufficient that, if it was believed by the jury, it would
proved that the defendants committed the crimes of which they were convicted. The purported
grantee of the deed transferring property to Anita Mae Butler testified that he did not sign the
deed, nor did he authorized anyone to sign for him. Anita Mae Butler apparently signed the
deed. The defendant Jimmie Butler, husband of Anita and son of the victim, signed the deed as a
witness to the signatures affixed thereto, including the forged signature of the victim. The expert
witness presented by the State testified that the signature of the victim on the deed was indeed a
forgery, perpetrated by one who knew of the victim's signature and one who tried to make the
6

deed signature look like a genuine signature. The forged deed was published (uttered) by the
defendant Anita Mae Butler and recorded. The defendants' jointly borrowed money on the home
based on the forged deed, in the amount of $75,000, and later put the home up for sale. These
acts occurred while the victim continued to occupy the home but without notice to him.
The defense claimed that the victim did indeed sign the Warranty Deed, probably while
intoxicated, and that the signing was witnessed by the daughter of the defendants who was also
the grand daughter of the victim. The jury had a clear choice. Did they believe that the victim
signed the deed, that he had now forgotten the signing, and that the expert witness was mistaken,
or did they believe that the defendants had prepared and uttered the deed for their own gain.
They obviously chose to believe the latter. It is certainly reasonable for the jury to infer that the
purported grantee and her husband, the ones who stood to gain from the forgery, and the ones
who did gain from the forgery, and the ones who would be in a position to simulate the signature
of the victim, were guilty of forging the document, or at least uttering a document that they knew
to be forged.
The Motion To Arrest Judgment is denied as it relates to the defendants' assertion that the
State failed to prove a public offense against the defendants.
JURY VERDICT THE PRODUCT OF PREJUDICE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE
The evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to convict the defendants of the charges
against them. There is no evidence in the record that the jury verdict was based on some other
motive than to do justice in the case. Defendants' assumptions and arguments do not prove that
the jury was in any way improperly influenced, nor does the court so find.
The Motion To Arrest Judgment is denied as it relates to that claim.
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THEFT CONVICTION HINGES UPON FORGERY
Clearly, the conviction of theft is inseparably tied to the conviction for forgery. The State
claims no independent basis for the theft charge. However, that statement of fact does not, in and
of itself, require that the judgment in this case be arrested, since the court has ruled that the
judgment on the forgery charge should not be arrested.
THEREFORE, the defendants' Motion To Arrest Judgment is denied. The case should
be set for sentencing as soon as practicable.
DATED this 3^\day

of October 2005.

J. FMip Eves, District Court Judge
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this "5> day of October 2005,1 mailed true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Troy Little, Esq.
Deputy Iron County Attorney
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, UT 84721
Michael W. Isbell, Esq.
Attorney at Law
2202 North Main Street, Suite 104
Cedar City, UT 84720

Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
tv» -mmrv

-,

/>VL^

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

vs.
ANITA BUTLER,

Case No. 0215001175
Judge John J. Walton

Defendant.

The above entitled matter came before the court for hearing on January 18, 2006, for
purposes of oral argument on Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Defendant Anita Butler
waived her appearance and appeared by and through her attorney Michael IsBell, and the State
of Utah appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County, Troy A. Little. The court heard
arguments and reviewed memorandum from both parties. The court enters the following ruling
on Defendant's Motion.
BACKGROUND
Defendants Jimmie Butler and Anita Butler were found guilty of forgery and theft by Jury
Verdict on February 18, 2005. Defendant now seeks a new trial pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Reference is made to the Memorandum Decision of Judge Eves dated October 3, 2005.
That Memorandum Decision contains a description of the facts and procedural history of the
case.

MOTION UNDER RULE 24
The court is not persuaded that a Motion for New Trial is the appropriate procedure to
pursue a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court can find no precedent for such a
Motion. Defendant's Motion is not based on newly discovered evidence. The parties stipulated
that the evidence Defendant claims should have been presented to the jury was known to her and
to her counsel at the time of trial. Nor are the grounds traditionally made the basis of a Motion
for a New Trial alleged in this case. Defendant may pursue her claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel on appeal.
COURT'S PRIOR DECISION
The court finds that Defendant's Motion (or a near duplicate of the current motion) was
previously filed by the Defendant pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as a
Motion to Arrest Judgment) and was denied by Judge Eves. The court finds the reasoning in
Judge Eves' decision persuasive in denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial. The
Memorandum Opinion dated October 3, 2005, is, therefore, incorporated herein.
DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim is that her trial attorney should have presented evidence to the jury of a
Power of Attorney allegedly granted by the victim to his now deceased wife. The Power of
Attorney was allegedly given to the victim prior to the execution of the deed the Defendant's
were found to have forged or uttered. The Defendant argues that since the victim's wife
apparently signed the deed that there would be no reason for Defendants to forge the victim's
signature. In short, the victim's wife could have transferred the property to the Defendants on
-2-

her husband's behalf pursuant to the Power of Attorney.
As Judge Eves previously ruled, Defendant's attorney's trial strategy was likely tactical.
Evidence of the Power of Attorney would have been at odds with the Defendant's key witness
who testified that she saw the victim sign the deed. Therefore, evidence of the Power of
Attorney may have been deemed contrary to the Defendant's most exculpatory evidence.
Defendant's other arguments claiming ineffective assistance of counsel were not
emphasized by Defendant at oral argument and the court finds that each constitutes second
guessing and conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's current
counsel may have tried the case differently, butJ:he decisions of trial counsel cannot be
successfully challenged by simply claiming that a different procedural or substantive strategy
should have been followed.
The court finds that there is not sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel as
required by Strickland vs. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
There has been no showing that counsel errors were so serious that Defendant's attorney was not
functioning as counsel as guaranteed the Defendant by the Sixth Amendment. There has been no
showing that a deficient performance prejudiced the defense or that counsel's conduct or his trial
strategy so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.
By granting the Defendant's Motion the court would be doing what Strickland prevents,
i.e... second-guessing trial counsel's strategic choices, however flawed those choices might
appear in retrospect. Nor has there has been a showing that but for defense counsel's
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unprofessional errors the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466
694.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The basis of Defendant's remaining arguments are not entirely clear but appear to be that
no public offense was committed, or that the Jury's Verdict was not supported by the facts of the
case.
The court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record on which the Jury could have
reached its Verdict. First, the court notes that Defendant should have marshaled the evidence in
support of the Jury's Verdict in attempt to demonstrate that the Verdict is not supported by the
record. The Defendant has not done so. In fact, Defendant has simply argued the evidence in a
manner most favorable to her position.
The court finds that the Jury had a choice: did they believe the victim signed the deed,
forgot the signing and that the expert witness was mistaken, or did they believe that the
Defendants prepared and/or uttered the deed for their own gain? The Jury's conclusion as to the
latter is supported by facts in the record.
The court finds that this Motion was denied by Judge Eves when previously captioned as a
Motion to Arrest Judgment. Notwithstanding the different standard that may be appropriate for
ruling on a Motion for New Trial, the same reasoning that Judge Eves applied in denying the
Motion to Arrest Judgment is applicable to Defendant's Rule 24 Motion for New Trial, and the
court incorporates Judge Eves' Memorandum Decision herein. The verdict is supported by the
evidence and there is adequate evidence that a public offense was committed. See Memorandum
Opinion of October 3, 2005.
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The Defendant's final claim is that the Defendant's theft conviction hinges on an
improper forgery conviction and should be set aside. However, the Court finds that the Jury's
forgery verdict is supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied.
Dated this

*f

day of May, 2006.

JOHN J. WALTON
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for New Trial by first-class mail,
postage fully prepaid, on this
Mr. Michael IsBell
Attorney for Defendant
46-398 Sherman Drive
Indio, CA 92201
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day of May, 2006, to the following, to wit:
Troy Little
Deputy Iron County Attorney
PO Box 428
Cedar City, UT 84720
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Deputy Court Clerk
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